

Byzantine-Resilient Peer Sampling for Large-Scale Distributed Systems

Thesis defended on April 24, 2026, by **Augusta Mukam**

Before a committee consisting of :

Mme Sonia Ben Mokhtar
M. Yérom-David Bromberg

Mme Patricia Thébault
M. Léo Mendiboure

M. Laurent Réveillère

M. Joachim Bruneau-Queyreix

Research Director, CNRS

Professor, University of Rennes

Professor, University of Bordeaux

Associate Professor, University of Pau and the Pays de l'Adour

Full Professor, University of Bordeaux

Associate Professor, Bordeaux INP

Reviewer

Reviewer


Examiner

Examiner


Thesis Advisor

Co-Advisor

Large scale distributed systems




Large scale distributed systems



Characteristics

→ large scale


Large scale distributed systems



Characteristics

- large scale
- dynamic (churn, failures)


Large scale distributed systems




Characteristics

- large scale
- dynamic (churn, failures)
- decentralized

How node discover themselves?




How node discover themselves?



How does a node choose its neighbors?

Jelasity et al. (2004)


The peer sampling service



Objectif

→ uniform random samples

The peer sampling service



Objectif


→ uniform random samples

Applications


- information dissemination
- overlay topology

The peer sampling service

view



The peer sampling service




Protocol



→ gossip-based propagation

The peer sampling service




Protocol



→ gossip-based propagation

→ push

The peer sampling service



Protocol




→ gossip-based propagation

→ push

→ pull

The peer sampling service




Protocol




- gossip-based propagation
- update view

- push
- pull

Under attack




Under attack



Objectif

→ bias sampling process


Under attack



Objectif

- bias sampling process
- being overrepresented

Under attack




Objectif

- bias sampling process
- being overrepresented

Consequence

- Node eclipse

Under attack




Objectif

- bias sampling process
- being overrepresented

Consequence

- Node eclipse

Under attack



Objectif

- bias sampling process
- being overrepresented

Consequence


- Node eclipse
- Target higher level protocols

Brahms overview

Gossip component

Bortnikov et al. (2015)

- push & pull requests
- update view




Brahms overview

Gossip component


- push & pull requests
- update view

Sampling component



- uniform sample of nodes



Under balanced attack



Under balanced attack



Byzantine-resilient peer sampling for large-scale distributed systems

1. Improve tolerance to Byzantine attacks

Built on top of Brahms
Occurrence counting
Collaborative counting

Mukam et al. (2024)

2. Count estimation for scalability

Comparative study of probabilistic datastructures
New performance metric
Bitmatcher

3. Unbounded stream count estimation


Decay and merge for probabilistic datastructures
Integration in Aupe

Mukam et al. (in preparation)


AUPE

**Collaborative Byzantine
fault-tolerant peer-sampling**


Aupe protocol




Aupe protocol




Aupe protocol



Aupe protocol




Debiasing procedure



Anceaume et al. (2013)

Collaborative counting




Trusted nodes



→ mutual authentication

Collaborative counting



Trusted nodes



- mutual authentication
- tracking component merge

Fault tolerance evaluation




N=10K

f=8-50%

AUPE Set cleaner

+

Collaborative debiasing



Fault tolerance evaluation





N=10K

f=8-50%

Bortnikov et al. (2015)

Auvolat et al. (2023)



Bortnikov et al. (2015)

Auvolat et al. (2023)




Collaborative work evaluation



N=10K

f=8-50%

t=10-30%



Collaborative work evaluation






N=10K

f=8-50%

t=10-30%


→ 60% better than Brahms

→ 65% better than Basalt



Robust frequency estimation for peer sampling in adversarial context


Sketches overview




Characteristic

- probabilistic datastructure
- fixed-size
- bounded error


Count min sketch



number of counter per row






+1




min

Count min sketch




 Inflated counts

Adversarial stream modeling




Problem with existing metrics




 Absolute Average Error

Key metrics for adversarial context




→ preserve frequency estimation

Key metrics for adversarial context



- preserve frequency estimation
- distinguish id classes

Key metrics for adversarial context



- preserve frequency estimation
- distinguish id classes
- estimate Byzantine ids overrepresentation

Bias factor





Experimental protocol



N=20K M=600K f=10%

20 to 80 KB

BM CMMCU LCU
CF CMSCU XY





Experimental protocol



N=20K M=600K f=10%

20 to 80 KB





Sketches evaluation



N=20K M=600K f=10%

20 to 80 KB




KL divergence

Sketches evaluation



N=20K M=600K f=10%

20 to 80 KB





KL divergence

Sketches evaluation




N=20K M=600K f=10%

20 to 80 KB



KL divergence




F1 score

Sketches evaluation




N=20K M=600K f=10%

20 to 80 KB



KL divergence




F1 score

Sketches evaluation




N=20K M=600K f=10%


20 to 80 KB



KL divergence



F1 score




Bias factor error

Sketches evaluation




N=20K M=600K f=10%


20 to 80 KB



KL divergence



F1 score



Bias factor error

Problem with the integration of sketch

How to decay the sketch?

How to aggregate two sketches?

Bitmatcher decay and merge for byzantine-resilient peer sampling



Bitmatcher overview

Characteristics


- improve memory utilization
- adjust counter sizes

Shi et al. (2024)


Bitmatcher overview



Bitmatcher overview





Bitmatcher overview




flag	fp_1	fp_2	fp_3	fp_x	fp_5
	cnt ₁	cnt ₂	cnt ₃	+1	cnt ₅


Bitmatcher overview




Space management




Space management



Space management



Space management



Decay challenges



capacity = 5 entries




4 entries




3 entries

BMDecay solution



capacity = 5 entries



4 entries



3 entries

BMDecay solution



Extract


<i>item</i>	<i>cnt</i>
...	...
$item_i$	cnt_i
...	...

Halving

<i>item</i>	<i>cnt</i>
...	...
$item_i$	cnt_i
...	...



Reinsert




BMDecay merge

flag	<i>a</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>c</i>	<i>d</i>	<i>e</i>



flag	<i>f</i>	<i>g</i>	<i>h</i>	<i>i</i>	<i>j</i>

BMDecay merge




sketch 1

Extract



<i>item</i>	<i>cnt</i>
...	...
$item_i$	cnt_i
...	...



sketch 2

Extract



<i>item</i>	<i>cnt</i>
...	...
$item_i$	cnt_i
...	...


Merge



<i>item</i>	<i>cnt</i>
...	...
$item_i$	cnt_i
...	...



Reinsert






Experimental protocol



N=1K M=10K-10M f=10%

Bitmatcher BMDecay




Sketches evaluation



N=1K M=10K-10M f=10%

Bitmatcher BMDecay




KL divergence

Sketches evaluation




N=1K M=10K-10M f=10%

Bitmatcher BMDecay



KL divergence




F1 score

Sketches evaluation




N=1K M=10K-10M f=10%


Bitmatcher BMDecay



KL divergence



F1 score




Bias factor error

Sketches evaluation




N=1K M=10K-10M f=10%


Bitmatcher BMDecay



KL divergence



F1 score




Bias factor error

Fault tolerance evaluation





N=1K f=10-30%



Collaborative work evaluation



N=1K f=10-30% t=10-20%



Conclusion

1. ■ Improve tolerance to Byzantine attacks

AUPE
Counting
Gains: 60% on Brahms

Mukam et al. (2024)

Conclusion

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2. Count estimation for scalability

Comparative study of various sketches
Bias factor
Bitmatcher

Conclusion

1. Improve tolerance to Byzantine attacks

AUPE
Counting
Gains: 60% on Brahms

Mukam et al. (2024)

2. Count estimation for scalability

Comparative study of various sketches
Bias factor
Bitmatcher

3. Unbounded stream count estimation

Bmatcher decay and merge
Integration in Aupe
Comparable to that of exact counting

Mukam et al. (in preparation)

Perspectives

1. ■ Additional analysis of AUPE
 - Impact on convergence

Perspectives

1. Additional analysis of AUPE

→ Impact on convergence

2. Deployment and real-world evaluation

→ churn

Perspectives

1. Additional analysis of AUPE
 - Impact on convergence
2. Deployment and real-world evaluation
 - churn
3. Other sampling methods

Byzantine-Resilient Peer Sampling for Large-Scale Distributed Systems

Thesis defended on April 24, 2026, by **Augusta Mukam**

Before a committee consisting of :

Mme Sonia Ben Mokhtar
M. Yérom-David Bromberg

Mme Patricia Thébault
M. Léo Mendiboure

M. Laurent Réveillère

M. Joachim Bruneau-Queyreix

Research Director, CNRS

Professor, University of Rennes

Professor, University of Bordeaux

Associate Professor, University of Pau and the Pays de l'Adour

Full Professor, University of Bordeaux

Associate Professor, Bordeaux INP

Reviewer

Reviewer

Examiner

Examiner

Thesis Advisor

Co-Advisor